Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions by Holmberg, Pär
 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 55665 

















IFN Working Paper No. 787, 2009 
 
 
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid 
Auctions  
Pär Holmberg  
 
    
 





December 31, 2008 
Abstract 
This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, 
procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function 
equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured 
if the hazard rate of the perfectly inelastic demand is monotonically decreasing and sellers have 
non-decreasing marginal costs. Multiple equilibria can be ruled out for markets, for which the 
auctioneer’s demand exceeds suppliers’ capacity with a positive probability. The derived 
equilibrium can be used to model strategic bidding behaviour in pay-as-bid electricity auctions, 
such as the balancing mechanism of United Kingdom. Offer curves and mark-ups of the 
derived equilibrium are compared to results for the SFE of a uniform-price auction. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The debate between proponents of settlements based on market-clearing prices and pay-as-bid 
schemes has a long history, most prominently in the context of auctions of treasury securities 
(Wilson, 2008). In recent years the U.S. Treasury and several other central banks converted to 
settlements based on market-clearing prices. This was partly motivated by that the revenue of 
the auctioneer was thought to be higher with a uniform-price auction (UPA) than with a pay-
as-bid auction (PABA). If the auctioneer’s revenue is higher in a uniform-price sales auction, 
then the auctioneer’s procurement cost would be lower in a corresponding uniform-price 
procurement auction (Krishna, 2002). In spite of this, the conversion trend in electricity 
markets and treasury auctions tend to go in opposite directions, perhaps because bidders’ 
valuations and their uncertainties in treasury auctions do not mirror suppliers’ production costs 
and uncertainties in electricity markets. Most electricity auctions are organised as uniform-
price auctions (UPAs), but one market –  the balancing market in England & Wales – has 
converted from UPA to PABA and similar conversions have been considered in other regions, 
e.g. California (Kahn et al., 2001). It was the belief of the British regulatory authority (Ofgem) 
that the reform, which also abolished capacity payments and replaced the day-ahead auction 
with bilateral contracting, would decrease mark-ups in wholesale electricity prices (Fabra et al., 
2006). Prices have indeed fallen after the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) were 
introduced.  But it is uncertain whether this was because of the changed market design or 
because of added capacity and forced and voluntary divestitures at the same time (Evans and 
Green, 2005). This paper contributes to the on-going discussion by characterizing strategic 
bidding behaviour in divisible-good, pay-as-bid procurement auctions and by comparing 
bidding in UPA and PABA. The model is primarily intended for electricity auctions. But a 
sales version of the model without capacity constraints would be useful when analyzing 
strategic bidding behaviour in pay-as-bid treasury auctions with non-competitive bids.  
In this paper, the fundamental assumptions used in the supply function equilibrium (SFE) of 
UPAs are employed to derive a SFE of a PABA. As in Klemperer and Meyer’s (1989) model it 
is assumed that production costs are common knowledge and that the auctioneer’s demand is 
uncertain. In the Nash equilibrium of the static game, each supplier commits to the offer curve 
that maximizes its expected profit given competitors’ offer curves. It was originally observed 
by Green and Newbery (1992) and Bolle (1992) that the set-up of the SFE model has many 
similarities with the organisation of electricity markets. Because in most electricity auctions, 
  2producers submit offer curves to a UPA and this is done before demand has been realised, i.e. 
demand is uncertain. Demand variation is added if offers are required to be valid for a whole 
day (long-lived bids), as was the case in the old electricity pool of England and Wales. 
Moreover, electricity production costs are fairly well-known. The validity of the SFE model 
has been questioned by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), because smooth offer curves are 
assumed while they are stepped in most electricity markets, and at least theoretically this may 
drastically change the equilibrium bids. Still, three empirical studies of strategic bidding in the 
balancing market in Texas (ERCOT) suggest that the SFE model is approximately correct in 
describing the behaviour of the largest producers in this market (Hortacsu and Puller, 2008; 
Niu et al, 2005; Sioshansi and Oren, 2007).  
First-order conditions for the PABA version of the SFE have previously been derived by 
Rudkevich (2003) and Wilson (2008), the latter model also considers transmission constraints. 
One contribution of this paper is that I derive a closed form expression of the equilibrium for a 
PABA with perfectly inelastic demand and symmetric producers with general cost functions. 
Perfectly inelastic demand is a good approximation for electricity markets, especially real-time 
markets, while the symmetry assumption simplifies the analysis. A corresponding closed form 
expression for UPAs has been derived by Anderson and Philpott (2002) and Rudkevich et al. 
(1998). Another contribution of the paper is that I analyze under what circumstances an 
equilibrium exists, which turns out to be far from self-evident in a PABA. A symmetric SFE of 
a PABA always exists if the hazard rate of demand is monotonically decreasing and marginal 
costs are non-decreasing. On the other hand, a symmetric SFE does not exist if there is any 
level of demand, for which all of the following three conditions are satisfied: Mark-ups are 
positive (i), the hazard rate is locally increasing (ii) and marginal costs are locally constant (iii).  
As in a previous paper (Holmberg, 2008), it is considered that demand exceeds market 
capacity with a positive probability in electricity markets, i.e. the loss of load probability 
(LOLP) is positive. This is a realistic and very useful assumption, because multiple equilibria 
can be ruled out, also when the risk of power shortage is arbitrarily small. In practice, LOLP is 
estimated from the standard error in the demand forecast and from the probabilities of having 
production failures in individual plants Newbery (1998). Newbery shows that the LOLP 
estimated by the system operator in Britain decreases exponentially with the scheduled reserve 
margin. Using data provided in Newbery’s paper and adjusting for that the system operator 
consistently overestimated LOLP, I roughly estimate LOLP during an half-hour to 0.1% when 
the scheduled reserve margin is 10% and that it roughly decreases by a factor 100 for every 
  3additional 10% of reserve capacity.
3 However, this estimate is indeed very uncertain. It is only 
provided to give some feeling of the magnitude of LOLP and how it depends on the reserve 
capacity. It is no doubt that the LOLP is positive also for large levels of reserve capacity, and 
theoretically this is enough to provide uniqueness. An empirical question, however, is whether 
LOLP is too small for large reserve capacities, so that real producers do not consider it when 
submitting their offer curves.  
The results of this paper, the equilibrium and the calculated difference between producers’ 
expected profits in PABA and UPA, are used by Hästö and Holmberg (2006) to prove that 
average electricity prices in pay-as-bid procurement auctions are lower than average prices in 
uniform-price procurement auctions if demand is Pareto distributed of the second kind. 
Simulations in this paper suggest that the relative difference in mark-ups will be largest when 
the risk of power shortage is small. Earlier comparisons of SFE in UPA and PABA get the 
same ranking of the auctions, but for cases more restrictive in terms of industry costs and the 
number of firms. Federico and Rahman (2003) analyze a monopoly and perfectly competitive 
market with linear marginal costs considering a linear demand curve with uniformly distributed 
shocks. The treasury auction with non-competitive bids analyzed by Wang and Zender (2002) 
corresponds to an oligopoly market with constant marginal costs and no capacity constraints, in 
which the perfectly inelastic demand is given by an inverse Pareto distribution. In their case, 
demand has an increasing hazard rate and the SFE of the PABA can only exist for non-pivotal 
producers. Earlier studies by Fabra et al. (2006) and Son et al. (2004) also get the same ranking 
of average prices, using a multi-unit auction model of a duopoly market with constant marginal 
costs.   
This paper is structured as follows. Notation and assumptions are presented in Section 2 and 
the unique SFE of a PABA is derived in Section 3. Section 4 compares SFE of UPA and 
PABA. Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
 
2. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Assume that there are N≥2 symmetric producers. Each producer i submits an offer curve to the 
auction in order to maximize its expected profit E(πi). The offer consists of a monotonically 
increasing supply function Si(p), where p is the price.
4 The inverse of the supply function is 
                                                 
3 The values are estimated from Fig. 5 in Newbery (1998) and that capacity payments in the old pool were 
proportional to LOLP. It is assumed that the system operator have overestimated the LOLP by a factor 50. This 
very uncertain factor is based on the reasoning in the appendix of Newbery (1998).  
4 Normally, electricity auctions do not accept decreasing supply functions. 
  4denoted by pi(Si). S-i(p) and S(p) denote the combined supply of firm i’s competitors’ and total 
supply in the marketplace, respectively.  The marginal offer and system buy price —the 
average price the system operator pays the producers — both depend on total supply and they 
are denoted   and   respectively. In a UPA, all accepted offers are paid the clearing 
price, i.e. 
() S p
() S U ≡
() , ˆ S p
() S p p U
) , while    in the PABA. As in Klemperer and 
Meyer’s (1989) original work, only equilibria with twice continuously differentiable supply 
functions are considered. Thus in a symmetric equilibrium, pi(Si) is smooth for 
where   is the total supply of all producers offered at the price cap 





*   ,   N , 0 Si ε ∈
* ε p . If 
firms are withholding capacity then   is less than  * ε ε , the total capacity of all producers. All 
firms have identical cost functions C(Si), which are increasing, convex, and twice continuously 
differentiable up to the capacity constraint. Let the marginal cost function be continuous from 
the left at the capacity constraint and assume that it fulfils  p N) ( C < ′ / ε . The marginal cost is 
infinite beyond the capacity constraint.  
Denote perfectly inelastic demand by ε, its probability density function by f(ε), its 





, by  ( ) ε G . The density 
function is continuously differentiable and has support on the interval [ ], ˆ , 0 ε  where ε ˆ is 
maximum (unrationed) demand. It is assumed that  , ˆ ε ε ≥  i.e. the capacity constraints of all 
producers will bind with a positive probability, which is allowed to be arbitrarily small. 
Demand is zero above the reservation price (price cap). The system operator rations demand by 
forced disconnection of consumers. 
 
3. THE UNIQUE SYMMETRIC SFE OF A PAY-AS-BID AUCTION 
This section derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the SFE of a PABA. In Section 3.1, 
the first-order condition of a PABA is derived. It implies that each risk-neutral firm chooses a 
supply function that independently maximises expected profit for each of its units of 
production, given residual demand. This can be compared to the SFE of a uniform-price 
auction, in which a firm chooses a supply function that independently maximises profit for 
each demand outcome, given residual demand (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). The first-order 
condition of the PABA is a differential equation which can be solved for general cost functions 
  5and the solution has one integration constant. In Section 3.2, the first-order condition is 
compared to Ramsey pricing and non-linear pricing. The integration constant is identified in 
Section 3.3 by considering that the risk of power shortage is positive; the symmetric 
equilibrium offers of all firms must reach the price cap exactly when the aggregate capacity 
constraint binds. This forms the end-condition. 
The first-order condition and the end-condition must necessarily be satisfied in equilibrium. 
In Section 3.4, a sufficient second-order condition is derived.  Unlike a UPA with perfectly 
inelastic demand, it is not possible to prove that all increasing, smooth, symmetric supply 
functions satisfying the necessary conditions are supply function equilibria of a PABA. In 
particular, it turns out that if the hazard rate of demand is locally increasing and marginal costs 
are sufficiently flat, then symmetric pure strategy equilibria of a PABA do not exist. On the 
other hand, I show that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists if the hazard rate is 
monotonically decreasing and marginal costs are non-decreasing.  
In section 3.5 it is shown that the first-order condition becomes particularly simple if 
demand has a Pareto distribution of the second kind, for which the inverse of the hazard rate is 
linear.  
 
3.1. The first-order condition 
It is assumed that firm i’s competitors follow a symmetric equilibrium candidate. The first-
order condition derived below must necessarily be fulfilled if the strategy implied by the 
symmetric equilibrium candidate locally maximises firm i’s expected profit. To avoid 
differentiability problems, all considered deviations of firm i satisfy  ( )( 0 0 j i p p = )  and 
( ) ( ) N p N p j i / / * * ε ε = . j ∀  Hence, for the considered deviations we always have that 
 and that  . These restrictions on the deviations are alright as 
long as we are calculating a necessary condition of a profit maximum. Sufficiency for a global 
maximum is checked later on, in Section 
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3.4. For demand outcome ε≤ε
*, the accepted output 
from firm i is given by . Note that firm i influences p(ε) by means of its chosen 
offer function pi(Si). The profit from an accepted offer of an infinitesimally small unit of supply 
is ( ) i i i dS S C S p ′ − . The firm’s profit for some shock outcome ε can be calculated by 
summing the profit from each unit. With infinitesimally small production units, the sum 
becomes an integral. 
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The expected profit of firm i is calculated by integrating across all shock outcomes and by 
weighting each outcome by its probability density f(ε). 
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The second term of this expression represents the contribution from demand outcomes 
exceeding market supply, in which case the accepted supply from firm i is ε
*/N. The domain of 
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Figure. 1. The domain of the integration in the calculation of the expected profit.  
 
Now the order of integration is reversed. The new integration limits follow from the domain of 
the integration shown in Fig. 1.  
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This result can be interpreted as follows. A firm’s expected profit is given by a sum over the 
expected profit from each of its units of supply. In its turn, the expected profit of a unit is given 
by its mark-up  () () [ i i i S C S p ′ ] −  times the probability that the unit’s offer is accepted, i.e. the 
  7probability that demand exceeds  ( ) [ ] i i i i S p S S − + . Proceeding with the analysis, we note that 
firm i chooses the offer function pi(Si) such that its expected profit E[ i π ] is maximised. That is, 
the firm faces a calculus of variation problem with the fixed terminal points   and  () () 0 0 j i p p =
( ) ( ) N p N p j i / / * * ε ε = . As there are no occurrences of  ( i i S p ) ′   in the integrand, the Euler 
equation degenerates to the following equation (Chiang, 1992):  
 
() () ) ()
() .   / , 0    
1
* N S
S S f S p S S p S F
p
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− = + ′ −
() S p i +
′ − −




The functional  represents the contribution to expected profit from an 
infinitesimally small unit of supply. Thus, the Euler equation implies that, given residual 
demand, expected profit from each unit is maximised independently of the firm’s other units. 
Because only equilibria with smooth and increasing supply functions are considered, (
( ) [ i i i i S p S , ϕ ]
2) can be 
written as follows:  
   (3)  () () [] ) () []
() () . / , 0 :    
1
* N p S p
p S f S p S p S F
i
i i i i
ε ∈ ∀
= ′ − + − − − −
( ) ( )( S N i ) p p S i 1 − In this paper only symmetric SFE are considered, i.e.  ≡ −
( [] 0 p i =
. Thus (3) can be 
further simplified to: 
   (4)  () [] ( ) )()     , 1 1 p p NS f S N p NS F i i ∀ ′ − − − () () () () p S C p p i ′ − () .   / , 0
* N ε ∈ : Si
A positive risk of power shortage implies that  () [ ] ε ε 0 ∀ > ε , 0 ∈ F 1 . Thus p>C’ and 
Si’(p)>0. Introducing the inverse hazard rate function, G(ε), (
−
() () ()
4) can be written as: 
  () [] ( ) () ( ) ( ) p p S N p NS G i i , 0     , 0 1 ε ∀ ′ − − N /
* p Si : ∈ p S C p i = ′ −
() () () . 0 ≡ ′ p Si
. (5) 
This can be compared with the first-order condition of a UPA for symmetric producers and 
perfectly inelastic demand (Holmberg, 2008).  
   (6)  ()( ) () 1 − ′ − − C p p S N p S i i
( ) Nx G . x    Note that the two first-order conditions are identical if  =
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p ] , (7) 
  8where A is an integration constant. 
 
3.2. The first-order condition as Ramsey prices and non-linear pricing 
In this section, I will show that the first-order condition is consistent with the inverse elasticity 
rule, i.e. Ramsey pricing (Tirole 2003), and that it has similarities with non-linear pricing. For 
a unit Si, (3) can be written in the following form: 
  () () ( ) []
() () []
( ) [ ] { }
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−  (8) 
The probability that unit Si’s offer is accepted,  ( ) [ ] p S S F i i − + − 1 , can be interpreted as the 
residual demand of this unit (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). Thus (8) is the inverse elasticity 
rule applied to a unit Si facing a residual demand of  ( ) [ ] p S S F i i − + − 1.   
The first-order condition in (8) also has similarities with optimal nonlinear pricing for the 
continuum-of-types case (Tirole, 2003; Wilson, 1997). Let types be distributed according to the 
density f(θ). Then it can be shown that a monopolist’s optimal unit price for a unit q is given 
by:
5 


















 (9)   
where   denotes the type of consumer that is indifferent between buying and not buying 
the q’th unit at price p. An important difference between nonlinear pricing and SFE of a PABA 




* θ ( ) p S i −
*
 is endogenous. Another key difference is that the 
price per unit increases with supply in a SFE, whereas the price per unit decreases with supply 
in the non-linear pricing literature. If  () 0 ≤
″
p q θ , then it follows from (9) that the hazard rate 
must be increasing if the non-linear price is to decrease, and this is a standard assumption in 
the non-linear pricing literature (Tirole, 2003; Wilson, 1997). We will see later that increasing 
hazard rates are problematic for SFE, and this can be attributed to the fact that supply functions 
are required to be upward sloping.      
  
                                                 
5 Note that the relation can be further simplified to 
( ) [ ]























2003). The simplified expression is the one normally found in the non-linear pricing literature. 
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3.3. Determining the integration constant 
Analogous to the derivation of the SFE of a UPA, the integration constant A in (7) allows for a 
continuum of potential equilibria (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). In this section, I argue that the 
integration constant can be uniquely determined if, as in (Holmberg, 2008), the capacity 
constraint binds with a positive probability.  
If  , * ε ε <  some capacity is withheld from the auction. However, it cannot be optimal to 
withhold power. Any offer is accepted with a positive probability and a producer will find it 
profitable to offer previously withheld units at or just below the price cap. Offering its whole 
capacity will increase the contribution to expected profit of demand outcomes   while 
the possible profit reduction associated with demand outcomes   can be made arbitrarily 
small.  
,
* ε ε >
* ε ε ≤
The highest offer in the auction must equal the price cap, because demand is perfectly 
inelastic. Otherwise, the highest offer could be increased without lowering the probability that 
its associated unit is accepted. Moreover, as stated in Section 2, the analysis is confined to 
equilibria with twice continuously differentiable supply functions. Hence   implying 
that
() , ∞ < ′ p Si
() 0 > ′ ε p .
6 Thus by construction supply functions cannot have horizontal segments at the 
price cap.  
In summary, the price of the marginal unit must reach the price cap but not before the 
capacity constraint binds. Hence, the integration constant can be pinned down by the end-
condition  ( ) p p = ε . It follows from (7) that 
()







ε , 0    
1


















du u F u f N u C N p F N
p ]
                                                
. (10) 
The same end-condition has been used to derive a unique SFE for UPAs (Baldick and Hogan, 
2001; Holmberg, 2008). In the multi-unit auction by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), the 
market-clearing price also reaches the price cap for high demand outcomes in UPAs. Offering 
supply all the way up to the price cap also has empirical support. In U.S. markets it has been 
 
6 The assumption simplifies the proof but is not critical. Allowing for offers with perfectly elastic segments does 
not change the result because, as in a Bertrand game, it is profitable to deviate from a symmetric equilibrium 
candidate with horizontal segments by slightly lowering ones horizontal offer to undercut competitors’ horizontal 
segments (Holmberg, 2008), as long as the horizontal segment is above marginal cost. The deviation significantly 
increases the probability that an offer is accepted, while the price reduction can be made arbitrarily small.   
  10observed that producers offer their last units of power at an extremely high price, a 
phenomenon called hockey-stick bidding (Hurlbot et al., 2004). There are often offers at the 
price cap (£9999/MWh) in the reformed market of Britain, and in some delivery periods such 
offers have even been accepted (Roques et al, 2005).   
 
3.4. The second-order condition 
Consider a symmetric equilibrium candidate satisfying the first-order condition in (4). For this 
candidate, let  () ε p (  be the marginal offer as a function of demand. The symmetric supply 
functions associated with the candidate are designated by  ( ). p Si
(
 If the aggregate supply of 
competitors equals  , i S−
(
 then — as shown by (2) — the expected profit from any unit of firm i 
is at a local extremum if the firm submits  ( ). p Si
(
 In equilibrium, it is necessary, but not 
sufficient, that the local extremum is a local maximum for each unit. Otherwise a producer 
could find a profitable unilateral deviation from  ( ). p Si
(
 Conditions under which the expected 
profit is at a local maximum for each unit is stated in claim i) of Theorem 1 below. Note that it 
also applies to markets without capacity constraints. Claim ii) is a sufficient condition, which 
ensures that the local extremum is a global maximum for each production unit. In this case, the 
expected profit of the firm is also globally maximized and  ( ) p Si
(
 is a symmetric NE. 
 
Theorem 1  
Consider an equilibrium candidate satisfying the first-order condition in (4). 
i)  () ( ) [] () () ( ) ( ) ε ε ε ε ε ε ε , 0   0 / / ∈ ∀ ≥ ′ ′ + ′ ′ − N C G G N C p (  is a necessary condition for it to be a 
SFE.  
ii) If  () [] ,   , 0   0 ε ε ε ∈ ∀ > ′ G  then the solution to equation (10) is a SFE (sufficient condition).  
Proof: See Appendix. 
    





 Hence, an increasing inverse hazard rate 
is equivalent to a decreasing hazard rate. It now follows from claim i) of Theorem 1 that if the 
hazard function is locally upward sloping, then smooth symmetric equilibria with positive 
mark-ups can be ruled out if marginal costs are sufficiently flat. That SFE with positive mark-
  11ups do not exist in PABA with constant marginal costs and increasing hazard rates generalizes 
a result by Wang & Zender (2002). Their treasury auction model corresponds to a pay-as-bid 
procurement auction, in which producers have constant marginal costs and no capacity 
constraints. If demand is given by the inverse Pareto distribution, which has an upward sloping 
hazard rate, they prove that the only possible SFE is that firms’ offer curves are equal to their 
marginal costs, i.e. mark-ups must be zero. In a market with capacity constraints that bind with 
a positive probability, mark-ups are positive for some demand outcomes and also the Bertrand 
solution can be ruled out if the hazard rate is locally increasing. There is some intuition behind 
the non-existent equilibrium. In the PABA, an increasing hazard rate, i.e. decreasing inverse 
hazard rate, implies that increasing solutions  ( ) p Si
(
 must be very concave,  () 0 << ″ p Si
(
, if the 
symmetric first-order condition in (5) is to be satisfied, especially if marginal costs are 
constant. This means that the residual demand of each firm becomes very convex. Existence is 
problematic under those circumstances, see for example non-existence results for monopolists 
or Cournot players facing sufficiently convex (residual) demand (Gravelle and Rees, 1996).     
 
3.5. The Pareto distribution of the second kind 
As shown below, the Pareto distribution of the second kind has the useful property that its 
inverse hazard rate is linear, which implies that the first-order condition becomes particularly 
simple. The probability distribution is 




+ − = x x F  (11) 
and the probability density 
  () () .
1 1 1 − −
+ = α α β α β x x f  (12) 
Hence, the inverse of its hazard rate is  









x G    (13) 
The parameter β  determines   as illustrated in Figure  () 0 f 2. When α is large, f has a steep 
negative slope for small arguments and a thick tail for large arguments, vice versa for small α.  
The density function is decreasing and strictly convex for all α,β>0. Thus the Pareto 
distribution of the second kind may be a reasonable approximation of the auctioneer’s demand 















Figure 2. The effect of α and β on the probability density function f(x). 
 
It follows from (13) that the inverse hazard rate of the Pareto distribution is non-decreasing 
for α≥0, which according to Theorem 1 implies that pure-strategy SFE of PABA exists as long 
as marginal costs are non-decreasing.  
With the Pareto distribution of the second kind, the first-order condition of the PABA in (4) 
can be simplified to 
    () ( ) () () () () , 0 1 ≡ ′ − ′ − − + p S C p p S N p NS i i i β α
which resembles the first-order condition of the UPA in (6). It follows from (10) that the 
equilibrium marginal offer in a PABA with a Pareto distribution of the second kind is  
  ()
































4. Comparing pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions 
4.1. Comparison of bid curves 
In this section equilibrium offers in pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions are compared for a 
simple example. Demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic and marginal costs are assumed 
to be constant and equal to c.  
Using (14), it is straightforward to calculate the equilibrium marginal offer in PABA. 












































































































This is the system buy price in PABA, i.e. the average price paid to the producers at the 
demand level ε.  
The equilibrium marginal offer for symmetric firms in a UPA can be calculated from 
(Holmberg, 2008), 
  () () () [ ε ,
u
























ε ] .    (17) 
In the special case of constant marginal costs, this can be simplified to: 
  () () .
1











ε  (18) 
The offer curves implied by (15), (16) and (18) are compared in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. In a UPA, 
the marginal offer (and system buy price) equals the marginal cost at zero supply (Klemperer 
and Meyer, 1989).  The unit with the lowest marginal cost still contributes to profits, as it is 
paid the marginal offer for ε>0. It is also true in general that the lowest offer in the pay-as-bid 
auction is higher than the marginal cost, at least if G(0)>0. This is realised from the first-order 
condition in (5).  Accordingly, the system buy price is generally higher in PABA when demand 
is sufficiently small. In both procurement auctions, all units except for the most expensive one 
are offered below the price cap. Thus the system buy price in a PABA is always below the 
price cap. In the uniform-price auction, on the other hand, the system buy price equals the price 
cap when demand equals or exceeds market capacity.  Hence, the system buy price is generally 
lower in the PABA when demand is sufficiently high. That the minimum system buy price is 
higher and the maximum system buy price is lower in PABA compared to UPA is in 
  14agreement with the experimental finding that price volatility is lower in PABAs than in UPAs 
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Figure 3. Prices as a function of demand are compared for the uniform-price auction (UPA) 
and pay-as-bid auction (PABA). N=2, μ=1 and α=1. 
 
In Fig. 3 the marginal offer in PABA is higher than or equal to the marginal offer in UPA. 
As stated below this is generally true for non-decreasing marginal costs if G(Nx)≥x.   
 
Theorem 2. For the same level of demand, the marginal offer in PABA is higher than or 
equal to the marginal offer in UPA if G(ε)≥ ε/N for [ ] ε ε , 0 ∈ .   
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The mark-up at zero supply in PABA is determined by G(0)=β. Increasing μ reduces β, and 
the mark-up decreases; compare Fig. 3 and 4. The intuition here is that reducing β increases the 
probability of having low demand outcomes (see Fig. 2) and accordingly producers put more 
weight on low demand outcomes when calculating their optimal pay-as-bid offers.    
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Figure 4. Prices as a function of demand are compared for the uniform-price auction (UPA) 
and pay-as-bid auction (PABA). N=2, μ=10 and α=1. 
 
When the power imbalance is negative, i.e. power production exceeds demand, the system 
operator needs to sell back power to producers in the balancing market, which becomes a sales 
auction (Holmberg, 2008). Firms’ alternative to not buying back power is to pay the marginal 
cost to meet their contracted production. Thus to make money on their balancing-down bids, 
firms offer to buy back power below their marginal cost. As the imbalance is perfectly 
inelastic, a price floor,  p, is needed to prevent the price from becoming arbitrarily small. Let 
the negative constant ε  represent the total down-regulation capacity in the market. The supply 
function equilibrium of the sales auction is anti-symmetric to a corresponding procurement 
auction. Imagine a procurement auction for which    ,  
* c c − = p p − =
*
 and  .
*
ε ε − =  Moreover, 
assume that the probability density of system demand in the fictional procurement auction is 
equal to the probability density of the system sales. Then the equilibrium of the sales auction is 
anti-symmetric to the equilibrium of the fictional procurement auction, i.e.   An 
equilibrium with both positive and negative imbalances is shown in Fig. 
() ( ) .  
* p S p S j j − − =
5. Note that the 
marginal offer/bid and system buy/sell price in PABA is discontinuous at zero demand, while 
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Figure 5. Prices as a function of the imbalance are compared for the uniform-price auction 
(UPA) and pay-as-bid auction (PABA). N=2, μ=10, α=1,  1 = ε ,  1 − = ε ,  0 = p , and  p c 3 . 0 = . 
   
4.2. Comparing expected revenues of producers 
In this paper, demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. As a result, total production in a 
pay-as-bid and uniform-price auction are identical. Furthermore, only symmetric equilibria are 
considered. This means that for every demand outcome, the most cost-effective generators will 
be accepted in both procurement auctions. Hence, production costs are the same in both 
auctions for all outcomes. System buy prices and mark-ups will differ, however. Producers’ 
mark-ups in the two auction formats are ordered by comparing their expected revenues.  
It follows from (1) that the total expected revenue for all firms in a PABA is  
  () () ( ) () () ( ) . 1 1
0 0
∫ ∫ − = − =
ε ε
ε ε ε d p F dS S p S F Rp  (19) 
For constant marginal costs and the Pareto distribution of the second kind, (11) and (14) can be 
used to derive the following expression (Holmberg, 2005).  
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d c  in (20) is the expected production cost (Holmberg, 









α ε , ,N g c p P  is a measure of the mark-up.  
The total expected revenue for firms in a UPA is
7 
  () () () () .   1
0 ∫ − + =
ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε p F d p f R U U   (22) 
The second term is the contribution from demand outcomes exceeding market capacity. The 
following can be shown for constant marginal costs and the Pareto distribution of the second 
kind (Holmberg, 2005): 
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Subtracting (20) from (23) yields: 
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 in Figure 6 illustrates the relative decrease 
of mark-ups when switching from a UPA to a PABA. The plot is not very sensitive to the 
number of firms. As the ratio is positive over a wide range of parameters, it seems that 
                                                 
7 Analogously  () () () () () .   ˆ 1 ˆ
0 ∫ − + =
ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε p F d p f Rp By means of integration by parts and the definition of ( ) ε p ˆ  it 
is straightforward to verify that this expression is equal to ( ).   19
  18. 0 ≥ − P U R R  Indeed, using (21), (24) and (25) this inequality is proven in a companion paper 
(Hästö and Holmberg, 2006). 





≈1, in the area for which both  β ε >>  and  1 < α , which corresponds to that in which 
G(ε) is small. As can be seen in Figure 7, this area also corresponds to a very low risk of power 
shortage. In the extreme case when α→0 and β→0, demand is zero with certainty. On the other 





≈0, for either large α (fat tail of the 
probability density function) or small ε  (small capacity), both of which imply a high risk of 
power shortage. 
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+ = F   the probability of a power shortage. 
 
Hästö and Holmberg (2006) prove that firms’ expected revenues are weakly larger in UPA 
than in PABA also for increasing marginal costs if the perfectly inelastic demand is Pareto 
distributed of the second kind. Firms’ total expected revenues are the same in both auctions 
under perfect competition and monopoly (Holmberg, 2005).  The perfectly inelastic demand is 
independent of the auction design. Thus larger producer-revenues in UPA imply that the 
demand-weighted average price is weakly lower in PABAs than in UPAs. Furthermore, as 
production costs are the same in both procurement auctions, average mark-ups are weakly 
lower in PABAs than in UPAs. Lower average prices in PABA imply a reduced procurement 
cost of the auctioneer compared to UPA. In a corresponding sales auction, the revenue of the 
auctioneer is higher in PABA (Krishna, 2002). Thus the auctioneer (and electricity consumers) 
will prefer the PABA auction both when it is buying and selling power if both positive and 
negative imbalances are given by the Pareto distribution of the second kind.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) framework for uniform-price auctions (UPAs) is 
similar to the organisation of most electricity markets and is often employed to model strategic 
bidding in such markets. This paper derives a SFE for a pay-as-bid auction (PABA), such as 
  20the balancing market of Britain. Some of the results are also relevant for pay-as-bid treasury 
auctions with random non-competitive bids.  
In contrast to SFE of UPA, SF equilibria of PABA depend on the probability distribution of 
demand, and so does the existence of pure strategy equilibria.  It is shown that a SFE of a 
PABA always exists if the hazard rate of the perfectly inelastic demand is monotonically 
decreasing and marginal costs are non-decreasing.  On the other hand, a SFE does not exist if 
there is any level of demand, for which all of the following three conditions are satisfied: 
Mark-ups are positive (i), the hazard rate is locally increasing (ii) and marginal costs are locally 
constant (iii).  These circumstances are rather restrictive, especially as most standard 
probability distributions, such as the normal and uniform distribution, have increasing hazard 
rates. In particular, there is a considerable risk that these non-existence conditions are satisfied 
in balancing markets, because system imbalances are approximately normally distributed 
(Garcia and Kirschen, 2006), and marginal electricity production costs are roughly stepped, i.e. 
approximately locally constant. That SFE with positive mark-ups do not exist in PABA with 
constant marginal costs and increasing hazard rates generalizes a result by Wang & Zender 
(2002). Applying their results for pay-as-bid treasury auctions to a corresponding procurement 
auction, they would imply that firms without capacity constraints would offer their supply at 
the constant marginal cost if demand follows an inverted Pareto distribution, which has an 
increasing hazard rate.  With capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability also the 
Bertrand solution can be excluded and no SFE would exist in PABA. The paper by Fabra et al. 
(2006) also indicates that there is a larger risk to lack a pure strategy equilibrium in the PABA. 
Generally, the system buy price is higher in PABAs compared to UPAs when the realized 
demand outcome is sufficiently low, but lower when realized demand is sufficiently high. This 
seems to be in agreement with the experimental finding that price volatility is lower in PABAs 
than in UPAs (Rassenti et al., 2003). The UK experience, however, is that price volatility 
increased after the introduction of NETA, at least initially. One explanation is that bids were 
long lived in the pool and that they are short lived in the new balancing mechanism. Moreover, 
the original NETA design was flawed, because penalty charges encouraged producers to retain 
their own balancing capacity to avoid imbalances in their own production instead of offering 
the balancing capacity to the market (Roques et al., 2005). This reduced the liquidity and 
increased the volatility in the balancing market. The volatility reduced considerably after this 
problem was fixed.  
A companion paper (Hästö and Holmberg, 2006) uses the results derived in this paper to 
prove that electricity consumers prefer PABA to UPA if demand is perfectly inelastic and 
  21given by Pareto distribution of the second kind.
 8 Simulations in this paper suggest that the 
relative mark-up difference in the two auction formats is largest when the risk of power 
shortage is very small, but then mark-ups should be so small, due to excess capacity, that they 
do not matter anyway. The relative difference is small when the loss of load probability 
(LOLP) is very high, i.e. when mark-ups would really hurt. It has been proven that mark-ups in 
the two auction formats are identical under monopoly pricing and perfect competition. In 
summary, the results suggest that switching to PABA will be most beneficial when the risk of 
power shortage is neither extremely small nor extremely large and when competition is 
imperfect without being extremely bad. The ranking result agrees with previous theoretical 
studies (Fabra et al. 2006; Federico and Rahman, 2003; Son et al., 2004; Wang and Zender, 
2002) but contradicts the findings of an experimental study (Rassenti et al., 2003) and an agent 
based simulation (Bower and Bunn, 2001). The experimental set-up differs to most of the 
theoretical set-ups in that demand was certain in the experiment (even if the players had to 
figure it out by themselves), and this may explain the different ranking results. Certain demand 
implies infinitely many equilibria, so the experimental results, unlike the theoretical results, 
were driven by equilibrium selection. Market prices were not publicly available in the agent 
based simulation, so agents with a large market share gained a significant informational 
advantage in a discriminatory auction, thereby facing less competitive pressure (Bower and 
Bunn, 2001). But market prices are publicly available in electricity markets, so Bower and 
Bunn’s result may not be so relevant for such markets. An empirical study by Evans and Green 
(2005) show that the change in the NETA design had little impact on average prices. One could 
take this as evidence that average prices are similar in UPA and PABA, which does not 
necessarily contradict the theoretical findings. But one has to be somewhat careful, because 
NETA did not only change the auction format but also changed other aspects of the market 
design – capacity payments were abolished, for example.  
A general assumption of the theoretical analyses is that firms are risk-neutral. Introducing 
risk aversion does not change the SFE of a UPA, as firms receive the best price for every 
demand outcome, given the bids of competitors. A risk-averse firm in a PABA, however, 
would put less weight on high-demand outcomes when profits are high and more weight on 
low-demand outcomes when profits are low. Hence, given the bids of competitors, risk-averse 
                                                 
8 In the balancing market, the auctioneer (and electricity consumers) will prefer PABA to UPA if both positive 
and negative imbalances are given by the Pareto distribution of the second kind. For positive imbalances, when 
the system operator is buying additional power from producers, the average price is lower in PABA compared to 
the UPA For negative imbalances, when the system operator is selling back power to producers, the average price 
is higher in the PABA compared to the UPA.   
  22firms decrease their bids to increase profits for low-demand outcomes. Intuitively this would 
also be true in equilibrium. It appears that with risk-averse bidders, the advantages (from the 
auctioneer’s viewpoint) of PABAs are likely to increase.  Another advantage of PABAs is that 
the risk for tacit collusion is lowered compared to UPAs. This is shown by both Fabra (2003) 
and Klemperer (2002).  
But PABA also has disadvantages compared to UPA. Federico and Rahman (2003) find that 
under perfect competition and elastic demand, output and welfare is lower in PABA compared 
to UPA, even if consumer surplus is larger in PABA. As noted earlier PABA has a higher risk 
of lacking a pure strategy equilibrium. It could be a disadvantage for both consumers and 
producers, as prices might vary unpredictably, either because of chaotic bidding or mixed 
strategy bidding as in Genc (2008). Kahn et al. (2001) also point out that in a UPA it is optimal 
for small firms to simply bid their marginal costs while in a PABA, all firms must forecast 
market prices if they are to receive any contributions to profits.  This introduces an additional 
fixed cost for small firms, which could be disadvantageous to competition in the long-run.  
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Solving the first-order condition 
In order to solve the differential equation in (4), it is transformed into an equation in terms of 
() ε p , the price of the marginal unit as a function of the demand, instead of   The same 
transformation is applied when solving the differential equation associated with the SFE of a 
UPA (Anderson and Philpott, 2002; Holmberg, 2008; Rudkevich et al., 1998). In the 
symmetric equilibrium, 
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where A is an integration constant. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1 
It follows from (1) that for a given Si, the expected profit from a marginal unit of firm i is 
  () ( ) [] ( ) ( ) [ , 1 , i i i i i i i dS p S S F S C p dS p S − ] + − ′ − = ϕ  (26) 
where p=pi(Si) is the offer of the marginal unit. Because competitors follow the symmetric 
equilibrium candidate  , i S
(
 (2) can be rewritten as 
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The profit of a unit,  ( ) p Si i , ϕ , is globally maximized at   if 
* p ( ) p Si i , ϕ  is quasiconcave in p or 
equivalently that it is single peaked. As f>0 and  ( ) , 0 , * S p η = i  this would be the case if 
() 0 , > i S p η  for () [ ) * , 0 p p ( ∈ p
9  and  ( ) , 0 < i S p η  for ( ].  Now it will be analysed 
under what circumstances this occur. The following is known from (
p p p ,
* ∈
27):  
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From the first-order condition in (5) it follows that  
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9 It is never profitable to offer a unit below  ( ), 0 p (  as the unit is always accepted at this price.  
  28Thus (28) can be written.  
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It follows from (4) that  () i S C p
(
′ >  for increasing supply functions. Further, marginal costs are 
non-decreasing and G(x)>0, as the hazard rate is never negative. To prove claim ii) consider 
the case when G(x) is monotonically increasing. If  () [ )
* , 0 p p p ( ∈ then  () ⇒ > p S S i i
(
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Analogously, it can be proven that    () [ ).   , 0
* p p p ( ∈ ∀ ( ) 0 , < i S p η ( ].   ,
* p p p∈ ∀ The result is 
true for all Si. Thus the profit of each unit of a firm is globally maximized, and there are no 
profitable unilateral deviations. Accordingly, the existence of a SFE is guaranteed for 
monotonically increasing G(x), which proves claim ii. 
There will certainly be deviations if the expected profit of some unit is locally minimised. 
Thus a necessary condition for a SFE is that all Si are at a local profit maximum. Accordingly, 
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10 Note that the differentiation involves the differentiation formulas for products and quotients, but most terms are 
zero because  ( )
* p S i S i
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=
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.  Thus there are only contributions when the derivative operates on either 
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  29Thus if the expected profit should be maximised for each of the firm’s units, then it is 
necessary that 
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Proof of Theorem 2 
From (5) it follows that the slope of a supply function in a PABA is given by: 
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= ′  (30) 
From (6) it follows that the slope of a supply function in a UPA is given by: 








= ′  (31) 
Comparing this slope with the slope in PABA we can conclude that if G(Nx)>x then the 
marginal offer in PABA is more price-responsive ( ′
i S  is higher) for every pair (p,Si). As both 
supply functions fulfil the end-condition  ( ) p p = ε , this means that the marginal offer in PABA 
is higher than the marginal offer in UPA for  [ ) ε ε , 0 ∈ if G(ε)> ε/N.        
  30